Book
Because You Promised: A Non-Reductive Account of the Normativity of Promises
(under contract with Routledge, to appear in 2026 in Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory)
This book manuscript is based on a substantially revised version of my dissertation. Please contact me if you would be interested in receiving individual chapters from the manuscript.
(under contract with Routledge, to appear in 2026 in Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory)
This book manuscript is based on a substantially revised version of my dissertation. Please contact me if you would be interested in receiving individual chapters from the manuscript.
Synopsis
As a moral phenomenon, promises have long enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, an enormous amount of attention in philosophical debates in both normative ethics and metaethics. One feature explaining this unrelenting interest may be a certain kind of tension inherent in some natural ways in which the phenomenon features in our ethical thought. On the one hand, that one is obligated to keep one’s promises appears to be one of the most straightforward, unquestionable moral truths around. On the other hand, promissory obligation, as an obligation voluntarily incurred through a performative speech act, has appeared to many as mysterious, and thus in need of a specific explanation. These two fundamentally different “faces” of promising find expression in two opposing theoretical paradigms: reductive views of promissory normativity on the one hand, and non-reductive views on the other.
This book sets out from this tension in order to substantially move forward debates both about the nature of promises and promissory normativity, and by extension, normative powers more generally. It carefully lays out and comprehensively defends a novel trust-based form of non-reductivism about promissory normativity. As is shown in detail, this view is able to retain the intuitively plausible central tenets of non-reductivism while still providing a powerful and theoretically appealing value-based explanation of our promissory power, a type of explanation which traditionally only reductive accounts have been able to provide. On the basis of a thoroughgoing and original structural critique of competing accounts, both reductivist and non-reductivist in nature, it is ultimately argued that the trust-based form of non-reductivism is a strong contender for the best available account of promissory normativity.
This book sets out from this tension in order to substantially move forward debates both about the nature of promises and promissory normativity, and by extension, normative powers more generally. It carefully lays out and comprehensively defends a novel trust-based form of non-reductivism about promissory normativity. As is shown in detail, this view is able to retain the intuitively plausible central tenets of non-reductivism while still providing a powerful and theoretically appealing value-based explanation of our promissory power, a type of explanation which traditionally only reductive accounts have been able to provide. On the basis of a thoroughgoing and original structural critique of competing accounts, both reductivist and non-reductivist in nature, it is ultimately argued that the trust-based form of non-reductivism is a strong contender for the best available account of promissory normativity.
CHapter Overview
Introduction: The Two Faces of Promising
I lay out the central tension in our thought about promises. On the one hand, that one is obligated to keep one’s promises appears to be one of the most straightforward, unquestionable moral truths around. On the other hand, promissory obligation, as an obligation voluntarily incurred through a performative speech act, has appeared to many as mysterious, and thus in need of a specific explanation. I then identify two theoretical paradigms that correspond to the two “faces of promising” – reductivism and non-reductivism – and thus set the stage for the discussion that is to follow.
Ch.1 Promises and Obligations
In this chapter, I argue that a promise is best understood as an attempt to place oneself under a directed obligation through a speech act the intention of which is to do just that. As I show, drawing on a variety of examples, this understanding enjoys wide support in our linguistic practice. For example, attempts to make promises made without the intention to obligate oneself are infelicitous, unlike promises made without the intention to keep. Similarly, the directed nature of promises is reflected in the fact that the conditions for a successful promise are not only ones related to the promisor, but also to the promisee. On the basis of these observations, the obligation view about the nature of promises is shown to be superior to alternatives, most prominently the intention view and the joint willing view.
Ch.2 Taking Promising at Face Value
In this chapter, I bring to bear the results from Ch.1 on the question of how to best explain promissory normativity. I argue that there is something inherently attractive about a view that takes promising at face value – that is, a view according to which we have obligations to φ when we have given a valid promise to φ because, and just because, we have promised. As I show, such a non-reductive view is a natural and theoretically elegant way to square the results of Ch.1 with what I will argue are some widely shared and stable intuitions about the way in which promises bind normatively. I lay out the theoretical core of non-reductivism and offer a useful restatement of the idea in terms of promising as a normative power
Ch.3 The Alleged Mystery of Non-Reductivism
In this chapter, I discuss the most important criticism of non-reductivism – the idea, tracing back to Hume, that the face value view of promissory obligation involves a profoundly mysterious or queer form of bootstrapping of obligation. I elaborate and critically evaluate several ways to flesh out the sentiment more concretely. In the end, I argue that the best way to lend substance to the bootstrapping worry is by viewing it in conjunction with an independent worry about promissory value-independence. I lay out how promises, when taken at face value, appear to be incompatible with what I (following Raz) call the Value Reason Nexus (VRN), a principle according to which whenever we have a reason to do something, this is ultimately explicable in terms of value. I ultimately show that all of the most plausible ways to flesh out the charge of mystery are premised on a commitment to something like VRN. Finally, I lay out why non-reductivists should these value-based challenges to their view seriously for both dialectical and substantive reasons.
Ch.4 The Alternative: Reductive Accounts of Promissory Normativity
In this chapter, I discuss the central alternative to the face-value account of promissory normativity – reductive accounts. I argue that even though reductive accounts manage to avoid the worries about bootstrapping and value-independence, they do so at the cost of giving up some important advantages of non-reductivism. Most importantly, they fail in giving an extensionally adequate account of which promises
bind, and how. I examine the four most prominent types of reductive theories to show that they all face extensional problems. These are, in turn, conventionalist theories (Rawls etc.), perlocutionary theories (Scanlon etc.), theories according to which our promissory reasons bottom out in reasons of self-interest (Hume etc.), and finally hybrid views, combining features of conventionalism and the perlocutionary view (Kolodny/Wallace etc.). Working with prominent candidate versions of these theories, I show for each type of account that certain structural features of that type of theory inhibit an extensionally adequate picture of which promises bind.
Ch.5 A Trilemma for Reductivism about Promissory Normativity
The problems for the “big four” reductive theories that I lay out in Ch.4 have the disadvantage that they at best have inductive relevance for the prospects of reductivism as a whole. Even as we show prominent reductivist candidates to fail, it might always be suggested that one could find an alternative version of reductivism that is able to capture all problem cases. In this chapter, I therefore attempt to move beyond this traditional “piecemeal” approach to show on purely structural grounds that reductivist theories necessarily yield counterintuitive conclusions. My central claim is that reductive theories face a trilemma regarding the specification of the feature in virtue of which they claim breaches of promises are wrong. I show that, whichever way a reductive theory specifies its given reduction base, it will either (i) face undergeneration worries, (ii) collapse into non-reductivism or (iii) face a Redundancy Problem, being forced to countenance promissory reasons without it being the case that an actual promise has been given. I illustrate the importance of this underdiscussed final problem by showing how it applies to an extensionally very well-placed form of reductivism, the Reductive Trust View.
Ch. 6 Expanding Non-Reductivism: The Two-Level-Account
In this chapter, I introduce what I call Two-Level Accounts of Promissory Normativity (TLAs) as a way of supplementing the central ideas of non-reductivism with a value-based grounding story in order to enable them to provide an answer to the worries discussed in Ch.3. I lay out and explain the structural features any such theory must have and show how this general idea, familiar from the work of Joseph Raz and David Owens, can be helpfully restated as a claim about the existence of a universal normative principle requiring promissory fidelity conjoined with a further claim about the value-based grounding of this principle. I then lay out some core advantages of TLAs, which are able to retain the central claim of the face-value account of promissory normativity, yet still retain compatibility with value-based views of the normative.
Ch. 7 The Objection from Wishful Thinking
In this chapter, I lay out, and respond to, a serious challenge to any view that tries to offer a value-based grounding of our power to give promises along the lines of a TLA. This is the worry that the explanation of the promissory principle in terms of the value of its obtaining amounts to an objectionable kind of wishful thinking. Perhaps surprisingly, this important issue has so far been neglected in the literature on extant proposals approximating the structure of a TLA. I mount a defence of TLAs against it that proceeds in two main steps. First of all, I make the important distinction between the normative component of our power to give promises and the material components of this power. Secondly, I argue that the explanation inherent in TLAs exclusively concerns purely normative principles at a high level of abstraction, the kind of wishful thinking involved in TLAs turns out to be benign. I support this claim arguing that friends of value-based grounding have to accept this type of reasoning as at least sometimes good reasoning if they are to properly capture some important moral truths about rights of personal autonomy. Finally, I respond to some objections levelled against my arguments against the charge of wishful thinking.
Ch. 8 On the Value of Promissory Control
Whether or not the project of giving a satisfactory TLA of promising is successful depends crucially on whether one can give a convincing account of the value that the availability of a promissory power is supposed to have. In this chapter, I tackle this question, laying bare important theoretical desiderata for any TLA in the process. I first discuss what is perhaps the most well-known account of the value of the promissory power – the social coordination view, most influentially defended by Hume. As I show, the social coordination view fails to account for some important features of our promissory practice and is by its nature not suited for an incorporation into a TLA. I then turn to two more recent views of the value of the promissory power: David Owen’s Authority View and the Relationship View, which draws on work by Joseph Raz. I show both of them to be suffering from serious flaws. Either they turn out to rely on values that don’t stand up to closer scrutiny, or on values that are not well suited to serve as the grounds for a promissory power in its specific familiar shape and form.
Ch. 9 The Two-Level Trust View
Finally, I propose a new trust-based version of a TLA, which holds that the normative control that promises afford us is valuable because it allows us to provide others with warrant for trust. I propose that since being under a voluntarily undertaken, directed obligation can serve as warrant for trust in cases where trust relationships are difficult to establish or have been damaged, it is good for us to be able to create such voluntarily undertaken, directed obligations through the exercise of a normative power of promising. I lay out and carefully defend this Trust-Based version of a TLA, showing how it avoids the problems that befall its previously discussed competitors. The resultant theory does justice to some very powerful intuitions about promises – intuitions that have traditionally been taken to support incompatible theories. The Two-Level Trust View can capture the idea, popular with reductivists like Scanlon and Hume, that promises are at their heart a tool for creating a kind of assurance. At the same time, it retains a commitment to the intuitive face-value view of promises driving non-reductivism. This, in addition to some further virtues I lay out in this Chapter, make it a strong contender for the best available account of promissory normativity.
I lay out the central tension in our thought about promises. On the one hand, that one is obligated to keep one’s promises appears to be one of the most straightforward, unquestionable moral truths around. On the other hand, promissory obligation, as an obligation voluntarily incurred through a performative speech act, has appeared to many as mysterious, and thus in need of a specific explanation. I then identify two theoretical paradigms that correspond to the two “faces of promising” – reductivism and non-reductivism – and thus set the stage for the discussion that is to follow.
Ch.1 Promises and Obligations
In this chapter, I argue that a promise is best understood as an attempt to place oneself under a directed obligation through a speech act the intention of which is to do just that. As I show, drawing on a variety of examples, this understanding enjoys wide support in our linguistic practice. For example, attempts to make promises made without the intention to obligate oneself are infelicitous, unlike promises made without the intention to keep. Similarly, the directed nature of promises is reflected in the fact that the conditions for a successful promise are not only ones related to the promisor, but also to the promisee. On the basis of these observations, the obligation view about the nature of promises is shown to be superior to alternatives, most prominently the intention view and the joint willing view.
Ch.2 Taking Promising at Face Value
In this chapter, I bring to bear the results from Ch.1 on the question of how to best explain promissory normativity. I argue that there is something inherently attractive about a view that takes promising at face value – that is, a view according to which we have obligations to φ when we have given a valid promise to φ because, and just because, we have promised. As I show, such a non-reductive view is a natural and theoretically elegant way to square the results of Ch.1 with what I will argue are some widely shared and stable intuitions about the way in which promises bind normatively. I lay out the theoretical core of non-reductivism and offer a useful restatement of the idea in terms of promising as a normative power
Ch.3 The Alleged Mystery of Non-Reductivism
In this chapter, I discuss the most important criticism of non-reductivism – the idea, tracing back to Hume, that the face value view of promissory obligation involves a profoundly mysterious or queer form of bootstrapping of obligation. I elaborate and critically evaluate several ways to flesh out the sentiment more concretely. In the end, I argue that the best way to lend substance to the bootstrapping worry is by viewing it in conjunction with an independent worry about promissory value-independence. I lay out how promises, when taken at face value, appear to be incompatible with what I (following Raz) call the Value Reason Nexus (VRN), a principle according to which whenever we have a reason to do something, this is ultimately explicable in terms of value. I ultimately show that all of the most plausible ways to flesh out the charge of mystery are premised on a commitment to something like VRN. Finally, I lay out why non-reductivists should these value-based challenges to their view seriously for both dialectical and substantive reasons.
Ch.4 The Alternative: Reductive Accounts of Promissory Normativity
In this chapter, I discuss the central alternative to the face-value account of promissory normativity – reductive accounts. I argue that even though reductive accounts manage to avoid the worries about bootstrapping and value-independence, they do so at the cost of giving up some important advantages of non-reductivism. Most importantly, they fail in giving an extensionally adequate account of which promises
bind, and how. I examine the four most prominent types of reductive theories to show that they all face extensional problems. These are, in turn, conventionalist theories (Rawls etc.), perlocutionary theories (Scanlon etc.), theories according to which our promissory reasons bottom out in reasons of self-interest (Hume etc.), and finally hybrid views, combining features of conventionalism and the perlocutionary view (Kolodny/Wallace etc.). Working with prominent candidate versions of these theories, I show for each type of account that certain structural features of that type of theory inhibit an extensionally adequate picture of which promises bind.
Ch.5 A Trilemma for Reductivism about Promissory Normativity
The problems for the “big four” reductive theories that I lay out in Ch.4 have the disadvantage that they at best have inductive relevance for the prospects of reductivism as a whole. Even as we show prominent reductivist candidates to fail, it might always be suggested that one could find an alternative version of reductivism that is able to capture all problem cases. In this chapter, I therefore attempt to move beyond this traditional “piecemeal” approach to show on purely structural grounds that reductivist theories necessarily yield counterintuitive conclusions. My central claim is that reductive theories face a trilemma regarding the specification of the feature in virtue of which they claim breaches of promises are wrong. I show that, whichever way a reductive theory specifies its given reduction base, it will either (i) face undergeneration worries, (ii) collapse into non-reductivism or (iii) face a Redundancy Problem, being forced to countenance promissory reasons without it being the case that an actual promise has been given. I illustrate the importance of this underdiscussed final problem by showing how it applies to an extensionally very well-placed form of reductivism, the Reductive Trust View.
Ch. 6 Expanding Non-Reductivism: The Two-Level-Account
In this chapter, I introduce what I call Two-Level Accounts of Promissory Normativity (TLAs) as a way of supplementing the central ideas of non-reductivism with a value-based grounding story in order to enable them to provide an answer to the worries discussed in Ch.3. I lay out and explain the structural features any such theory must have and show how this general idea, familiar from the work of Joseph Raz and David Owens, can be helpfully restated as a claim about the existence of a universal normative principle requiring promissory fidelity conjoined with a further claim about the value-based grounding of this principle. I then lay out some core advantages of TLAs, which are able to retain the central claim of the face-value account of promissory normativity, yet still retain compatibility with value-based views of the normative.
Ch. 7 The Objection from Wishful Thinking
In this chapter, I lay out, and respond to, a serious challenge to any view that tries to offer a value-based grounding of our power to give promises along the lines of a TLA. This is the worry that the explanation of the promissory principle in terms of the value of its obtaining amounts to an objectionable kind of wishful thinking. Perhaps surprisingly, this important issue has so far been neglected in the literature on extant proposals approximating the structure of a TLA. I mount a defence of TLAs against it that proceeds in two main steps. First of all, I make the important distinction between the normative component of our power to give promises and the material components of this power. Secondly, I argue that the explanation inherent in TLAs exclusively concerns purely normative principles at a high level of abstraction, the kind of wishful thinking involved in TLAs turns out to be benign. I support this claim arguing that friends of value-based grounding have to accept this type of reasoning as at least sometimes good reasoning if they are to properly capture some important moral truths about rights of personal autonomy. Finally, I respond to some objections levelled against my arguments against the charge of wishful thinking.
Ch. 8 On the Value of Promissory Control
Whether or not the project of giving a satisfactory TLA of promising is successful depends crucially on whether one can give a convincing account of the value that the availability of a promissory power is supposed to have. In this chapter, I tackle this question, laying bare important theoretical desiderata for any TLA in the process. I first discuss what is perhaps the most well-known account of the value of the promissory power – the social coordination view, most influentially defended by Hume. As I show, the social coordination view fails to account for some important features of our promissory practice and is by its nature not suited for an incorporation into a TLA. I then turn to two more recent views of the value of the promissory power: David Owen’s Authority View and the Relationship View, which draws on work by Joseph Raz. I show both of them to be suffering from serious flaws. Either they turn out to rely on values that don’t stand up to closer scrutiny, or on values that are not well suited to serve as the grounds for a promissory power in its specific familiar shape and form.
Ch. 9 The Two-Level Trust View
Finally, I propose a new trust-based version of a TLA, which holds that the normative control that promises afford us is valuable because it allows us to provide others with warrant for trust. I propose that since being under a voluntarily undertaken, directed obligation can serve as warrant for trust in cases where trust relationships are difficult to establish or have been damaged, it is good for us to be able to create such voluntarily undertaken, directed obligations through the exercise of a normative power of promising. I lay out and carefully defend this Trust-Based version of a TLA, showing how it avoids the problems that befall its previously discussed competitors. The resultant theory does justice to some very powerful intuitions about promises – intuitions that have traditionally been taken to support incompatible theories. The Two-Level Trust View can capture the idea, popular with reductivists like Scanlon and Hume, that promises are at their heart a tool for creating a kind of assurance. At the same time, it retains a commitment to the intuitive face-value view of promises driving non-reductivism. This, in addition to some further virtues I lay out in this Chapter, make it a strong contender for the best available account of promissory normativity.
Published Papers
- Perspectivism and Rights, forthcoming, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
- Must We Worry About Epistemic Shirkers?, 2024, Inquiry, online first: 1-26 - Philpapers entry with abstract, Full Text, Accepted Manuscript
- Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing, 2022, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2): 324-347 - Philpapers entry with abstract, Full Text (Open Access)
- Value-Based Accounts of Normative Powers and the Wishful Thinking Objection, 2022, Philosophical Studies 179 (11): 3211-3231 - Philpapers entry with abstract, Full Text (Open Access)
- Trust-Based Theories of Promising, 2020, Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280): 443-463 - Philpapers entry with abstract, Full Text, Accepted Manuscript
- Error Theory, Unbelievability and the Normative Objection, 2019, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2) - Philpapers entry with abstract, Full Text (Open Access)
Other Publications
- Bruno, D., Pope-Caldwell, S. M., Haberl, K., Hanus, D., Haun, D., Leisterer-Peoples, S., et al. (2022): Ethical Guidelines for Good Practice in Cross-Cultural Research. Leipzig: Department of Comparative Cultural Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. doi:10.17617/2.3391449. Full Text (Open Access)
Work in Progress
- Paper on whether objectivism about ought can account for the normative relevance of risk and recklessness.
- Paper on why Scanlonian contractualists have reason to make room for normative interests within their theory.
- Paper developing a novel concept of excused action from considerations of expectability and the possibility of supererogatory surmounting of excusing conditions.
Please contact me for draft versions and/or slides from presentations.
